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This paper looks at alleged 'blocked exchanges' where, it is claimed, there are 
moral reasons for reserving particular areas of life from the market. It has 
sometimes been argued that there are some goods which should not be 
distributed according to market principles, and that the reason for this is that 
there is something about the nature of these goods which makes market 
distribution particularly inappropriate. While I think that that there are some 
goods of this sort I also think that they may be rarer than sometimes 
assumed. More often blocked exchanges are to be explained either in 
consequential terms, or in terms of the rules and institutional frameworks in 
which they are embedded. This raises the question of whether we should 
attempt to preserve such a non-market sphere, and if so why. One important 
case is that of trying to preserve the values of an associational practice. Yet 
even here the issues are complex and there can be arguments on both sides. 
Here I argue that although it is important to preserve a non-market sphere, it 
may be less important what is in it.
2Market Exchange, Blocked Exchanges and Externalities
A market transaction is a miraculous thing. If all goes well it creates a Pareto 
improvement; making both sides better off and no one worse off. In the face 
of this it may be hard to find reasons to contemplate reasons to limit market 
transactions. Of course questions arise if it the exchange is against the 
interests of one of the parties. And again if it creates negative externalities -
third party effects. But otherwise what reason can we have?
One much discussed reason is that free and voluntary transactions can, it is 
claimed, lead to injustice. I will not, however, pursue that directly here. 
Rather I want to look at what has come to be termed 'blocked exchanges'; 
that there are some things that simply shouldn't be bought and sold. In 
recent years, the criticism that the market allows the purchase and sale of 
things that shouldn't be purchased and sold is especially associated with 
Michael Walzer. But of course this goes back to Marx, and through Marx to 
Shakespeare.
But can it be wrong to sell things between willing parties? Certainly some 
people think this. There are many common examples. The permissibility of 
selling one's own kidneys has been under discussion for some time now; 
selling oneself into slavery for much longer. The morality of selling one's baby 
has been a recent theme on Coronation Street. But in real-life there are 
genuine examples of things that used to be sold which now seem amazing to 
3us. In the nineteenth century, for example, it was possible to buy and sell a 
commission in the British Army. Officers were people who had bought their 
posts, and would sell them again. Now this is no longer the case, and the 
suggestion to reintroduce would be treated as some sort of parody of free 
market economics. But why?
Presumably the army was reformed because it was thought that this practice 
had pernicious externalities; presumably we started losing wars, or, at least, 
large numbers of people. Hence the principle of the market price has been 
replaced by a principle of fitness for purpose, which now generally permeates 
the entire world of work. Here, then, the argument seems to be that a market 
in which people can purchase posts will so clearly lead to bad consequences 
that this provides sufficient reason to prohibit the practice. Nowadays we may 
talk about equality of opportunity for its own sake, but its initial justification 
appears to have been to allow the rise of the meritocracy for the sake of the 
general good. 
But can all blocked exchanges be understood in this way? Would selling 
kidneys or babies have disastrous consequences? Do we know this? And do 
such beliefs explain the positions of those who want to keep the exchanges 
blocked? If so, presumably were we able to devise forms of regulated 
markets to ensure good outcomes only, then the opposition should drain 
away. Yet this does not seem likely. The undesirability of third party effects 
do not seem to me to explain why I am resistant to a market in organs from 
4living donors. However the more I think about it, the more convinced I am 
that our - or at least my - intuitions in this area are unreliable. By this I don't 
mean that they are wrong, but that the most obvious explanation of why we 
hold them may not be the best explanation.
In what follows I will argue that there are many different reasons for 
questioning particular exchanges and thus, potentially, many types of blocked 
exchanges. Although I do think there are moral limits to the market, the 
moral reason for the limits are not always so obvious.
The most straightforward type of case is where strictly it should be impossible 
to purchase what is offered for sale, as the nature of the good is, for some 
reason, incompatible with the idea of a trade for money. Love, friendship, 
moral praise and salvation are common examples. Of course it is possible to 
buy services which superficially resemble love and friendship, and so on, but, 
some have argued, these goods themselves are conceptually not available for 
sale. If so, anyone offering such things is trying to pull off a fraud.
But is it so straightforward? Marx writes the following:
 ' I am ugly, but I can buy myself the most beautiful women. Consequently I 
am not ugly, for the effect of ugliness, its power of repulsion, is annulled by 
money.'
5Although on a first reading one might think that Marx's point is about 
prostitution, Marx seems to have something else in mind. He seems to be 
suggesting that money makes an ugly person genuinely attractive, and he 
may well be right. Yet, he seems to suggest, this is morally problematic; as if 
one shouldn't become attractive on the basis of one's money. Indeed it seems 
implied that only one's looks should be relevant (a view one would not 
normally think of associating with Marx). But the implication is that anything 
else is a subversion or corruption.
Now whatever we think about this particular example, the interesting thing 
about it is its form. The idea seems to be that there is a proper ground for 
finding someone attractive. An attempt can be made to replace this ground 
with money, but whether or not this is successful, it is, nevertheless, 
problematic. We saw two variants of  the alleged problem. First it could be 
conceptually impossible, or second it is possible but corrupt. How, though, 
can we understand this notion of corruption? The problem is made more 
difficult by the thought that it would now seem deeply corrupt to sell a 
commission, yet apparently it was once common practice.
We can achieve a degree of illumination from Michael Walzer who argues that 
there are several 'spheres of justice' each distributing goods specific to that 
sphere, and regulated by its own principles, which are derived from the 
particular socially relative 'social meaning' of the good in question. Although 
6many have questioned Walzer's relativism, the British army example may 
provide it with some support.
One prominent example from Walzer is the relation between political power 
and money. Walzer points out that in many societies, including his own, not 
only can money help you towards political power, political power can help you 
towards money. Such interference between the spheres Walzer thinks of as 
tyranny. This may put it a little strongly, but certainly we view it a  corrupt. It 
seems easier, however, to say that to use politics to become rich is a misuse 
of political power than to say that to use money to gain political office is a 
misuse of money. Rather, it seems, that ideally we want politics to be 
screened off from commercial matters, even if we have happened to have 
been rather unsuccessful in this respect. And perhaps this turns out to have 
some things in common with the army case after all. We don't want a political 
system which may lead to disaster, or even disregard of the citizens' interests, 
and letting politics and money mix too closely is going to be bad for almost all 
of us. So despite earlier appearances perhaps even this case could possibly be 
explained in terms of third party effects. Consequently it is not impossible that 
even this paradigm example of blocked exchanges has less to do with the 
intrinsic nature of the good - political power - and more to do with the 
pernicious effects of  letting it be sold.
Let us consider some other examples. When I first started working at UCL the 
University sold parking permits at a very cheap price to anyone who wanted 
7one. Unfortunately, though, there were very few parking spaces, and to get 
one required getting to work before the scientists; that is around 7.45. which 
is what I used to do. If you missed a space, the only alternative short of 
returning home, was to park in the NCP for about ten pounds a day. At that 
time I was reading a certain amount of economic theory and it struck me that 
by getting my space early I had gained possession of a scarce resource. 
Consequentially there could be money to be made. Suppose I let it be known 
that at around 9.30 I would be willing to give up my space to another, for the 
price of, say, five pounds. Possibly when they had got over the shock of the 
offer, I would find a willing buyer. This would be a Pareto improvement - I 
would be better off, the purchaser would be better off and no one, it seems, 
would be harmed. But if I had actually done this, and the University 
authorities discovered it, I would probably have been fired for misconduct.
There are many similar examples. Suppose in the rush-hour you are on a 
crowded tube train and a businessman in a hand-made suit offers you a fiver 
for your seat. What would you think? Or suppose it isn't you who is offered 
the money, but the person next to you. And suppose the transaction is 
completed to the apparent satisfaction of both parties. What would you think 
of that? One can almost hear the murmurs of disapproval going round the 
carriage. 
Or consider ticket touting. Many find this a highly dubious activity, and it is 
true that it is often mixed in with various forms of deceit. But where it isn't it 
8can be hard to say precisely what is wrong with it, as in the car park example 
or the seat on the tube example. It is hard to say that there is anything in the 
nature of these goods themselves that leads us to wish to block their 
exchange. Do we really what to say that market transactions corrupt the 
social meaning of parking; sitting down on the train; or going to 
entertainment events? Or even, like the army and politics, that they all have 
serious third party effects? Actually, in themselves, they all seem rather 
trivial.
Now the funny thing about the car park example is that a few years after I 
joined UCL the management decided to change to a new scheme, issuing 
permits for particular spaces at market price. The space I used to park in 
turned out to be one of the premium ones (well it was in the front quad, just 
by the portico) and was up for one thousand five hundred pounds a year. By 
that time I had changed by habits anyway and was not interested in a space. 
And of course there was a lot of grumbling, and some insistence amongst the 
highest paid staff that they should receive a pay rise to compensate for the 
cost of parking. But within a year or so this was the established system and 
as far as I know it was accepted as a reasonable, if somewhat opportunist 
policy.
Consider, too, the seat case. Many forms of public transport offer more than 
class of comfort where more money buys you a better seat, or a better 
chance of a seat. It is true that there could be reasons for wondering whether 
9such provision violates some principle of equality, expressing and reinforcing 
unjustified social privilege. Yet the disapproval likely to attach to making a 
private additional payment for a seat on the tube train seems to go further 
than any disapproval about differential ticket pricing. Rather it goes to a 
sense that such things just shouldn't be done.
My explanation of these cases starts from the observation that where a good 
is scarce, any society needs a rule for its distribution. Often we use a rule 
which has an element of 'first come first served'. But this is not the only 
possibility. Charging a market-clearing price is another. What we see in the 
car parking and seat cases is that when a rule is in force, we do not take 
kindly to someone who tries to  operate as if another rule was in place. It is 
not that parking spaces and seats should not be distributed on market pricing 
principles. Rather that when another rule is in place it is unfair, or possibly 
exploitative, to subvert  it for your own ends, even if it does no-one any 
harm. This is a third party effect of sorts, but very different to the other 
examples we have seen. Were we to replace the rule wholesale with another 
one, then once we have got over transitional effects, we would get used to it 
easily enough. 
By way of further illustration, consider again the practice of ticket touting. 
Tickets for some very popular sporting events, for example, are sold at below 
market clearing price, as they tend to be sold at a price established by 
custom, rather than one based on the attractiveness of the particular fixture. 
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This is a case where allocation is based on first come first served, subject to 
paying the required price. Tickets sometimes sell out early and the conditions 
are ripe for a black market, which comes into being. Consider, for example 
rugby internationals at Twickenham. Tickets often change hands at much 
above face value, and touting is commonplace, which generates both 
approval from anyone prepared to pay over the odds for a ticket and 
disapproval from others.
One good thing about the current system is that current ticket prices mean 
that the event is affordable to a wider section of the population than would 
otherwise be the case. But suppose Twickenham decided to outdo the touts 
by putting all tickets up for auction on ebay, with the auction closing the day 
before the game. Although there would be protests at first, we might come to 
think that this is a reasonable way to allocate tickets. After all we are used to 
auction pricing in many other contexts. Sotheby’s and Christies are not 
expected to give the sale item to the first bidder. If it is right that we could 
easily flip from one allocation rule to another, then we can see that there is a 
species of blocked exchange that has little or nothing to do with the nature of 
the item traded. Rather, we have a rule for allocating a scarce good, and we 
sometimes treat this rule as unquestionable, almost as a sacred taboo. Yet we 
would have no difficulty in switching to a new system with a different 
allocational rule, provided it is generalised and applies to all. This is a type of 
conventional or contingent blocked exchange. It reveals one type of moral 
limit to the market, but not one rooted in the nature of goods.
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The confusion between blockages being rooted in the nature of the goods, 
and being rooted in other social factors, is a common one, and one I have 
made myself before. And allocation rules are not the only social factors in 
play. Here is a quite different case, from the sphere of compensatory justice. 
Many years ago I read a detective story which featured an elderly American 
couple who we extremely proud of their new Cadillac. One morning they 
came downstairs and went to their locked garage only to find a dead body in 
their locked car. Naturally they calling the police who took away body and car 
for forensic tests. A week later, they wrote to the Police Department saying 
that because of the unpleasant surrounding the car they couldn't face having 
it back, and suggested that the police department replace it. Only this time 
they'd like one in white with a red trim, please, which shouldn't cost any 
more. The Department replied with a curt note saying that they could have 
the car back when the tests were finished. But imagine now that the tests did 
indeed destroy the car and the police accept that they have a duty to replace 
it. And suppose that the white one is actually cheaper, so supplying it would 
be a Pareto improvement; everyone would be better off. Still, it seems to me, 
there is a duty only to replace it with one of the original colour. Somehow it 
seems wrong to ask for anything else; as if it is a misunderstanding of the 
situation. Of course once the request is made, it would be rather churlish of 
the police to decline it. But that doesn't mean that they have any duty.
But again it would be absurd to conclude that this shows us anything about 
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the proper grounds for the distribution of Cadillacs. Rather it seems to be an 
application of a little noticed axiom of deontic logic which we could call the 
inalienability of duty. If A has a duty to provide B with x, and B would rather 
have y, and y is cheaper or easier for A to supply, nevertheless A has no duty 
to provide B with y.  
In all of this we have come no closer to the idea that some goods should be 
protected from the market because of the nature of the goods themselves. 
The most plausible cases are those where there is something in the nature of 
a good itself such that selling it destroys the good. Love and friendship may 
remain the best candidates.
Another form of argument that there are areas of life which should be kept 
free from the market starts from the observation that much of what we find 
of value in our lives comes not from the market, or from the state, but from 
voluntary associations: things people do for themselves and others but for 
non-commercial reasons. Clubs, associations, and less formal groupings of 
friends and family networks fall into this area. In our own time the internet is 
the perfect example. Although there is now a great deal of commercial use of 
the internet, and it is also used for state and other governmental purposes, 
there is still a huge amount of material put on the internet simply because 
people think it is worthwhile to do so. Why do people think it worthwhile? It is 
hard to say, in other terms, but clearly it of great value to many people, 
giving them a sense of purpose and connectedness with others. 
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The argument here is that there are values intrinsic to voluntary associations, 
or, in MacIntyre's terms, practices. Russell Keat has made this argument 
about the limits to the market. Practices have their own traditions, excellences 
and virtues. Keat is particularly exercised by the market's role in supplying 
cultural goods. Once the market gets a foothold, commercial values will 
corrupt the practices, the traditions will be forgotten and the virtues will 
wither in pursuit of money. This argument has been made recently on behalf 
of two state organisations masquerading as voluntary associations: the BBC 
and the Universities.
As a more general question, why should we think that cultural goods are 
more appropriate left within voluntary associations? Possibly one argument is 
that they should be made available to all, but the market cannot guarantee 
this. This is important and I will return to it. But is this so clear? Certainly in 
recent years certain arrears of life have changed their status from voluntary 
associations to commercial organisations. Think of the Olympic movement. 
Not long ago you would have been banned for life if you accepted payment. 
Now top athletes earn good money. Has this made sport worse? We can 
argue about the details, if we were so minded, but it is hard to make out the 
case that sport is now corrupted. Changed, yes, corrupted no. Might we not 
say the same thing about education? Cultural goods?
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Does this mean that everything should be supplied on the market. This does 
not follow from what I have said. From the fact, if it is a fact, that it is not the 
case that anything in particular should be reserved from the market, it does 
not follow that everything should be supplied on the market. In fact, I think 
there should be a rather large non-market sphere. But rather perversely, I am 
coming round to view that it may not matter so much what is in the market 
sphere and what is not.
Let us ask, first of all, why we should have a non-market sphere at all? Let us 
approach this by considering what is probably the most famous example of 
all: Timuss's famous blood donation example. Titmuss compared the British 
system of the 'gift relation' where blood is given, not sold, with the US system 
in which a substantial amount of blood is purchased.
Titmuss saw two advantages in the donation system. First, he claimed, you 
got better blood. Second, the practice encouraged feelings of social solidarity. 
Now the first is contingent, and has been contested. It is said that commercial 
blood banks responded much more quickly to HIV infection, for example. The 
second seems undeniabe. For example, after a major crisis, such as 9/11, you 
may find blood donation drives even in countries without such a tradition, as 
a way of expressing grief and solidarity with the victims. And it seems 
appropriate that blood should have such a role, as it is a 'good' with such 
symbolism and resonance. Nevertheless is it so clear that we could not have 
chosen some other good, either as well or instead? In some countries people 
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take on the duty to keep the roadside that borders their property 
immaculately clean, as a civil duty. Is that better or worse than blood 
donation? 
These cases look primarily at the supply side of the transaction, in terms of 
the quality of good and the implications of supplying it on a voluntary basis. 
Yet we also need to look at the consumption side too. Here I want to look at 
two arguments for reserving a range of goods from the market.
The first is perhaps the more obvious. If all goods are available only on a 
market basis, those who have not made an economic success of their lives 
will be excluded from almost everything else too. Allowing non-market 
provision can make available a normal range of fulfillments available to a 
broader range of people. From free concerts in the park, to free medical care 
an economically unsuccessful life can still be relatively secure and full of 
enjoyment, even if choice is more restricted. Some of these goods will be 
provided by the state, some by voluntary associations for their own sake, and 
some by individuals out of a sense of civic duty.
A second argument concentrates on the public sector, and compares two 
types of economic relation. The first, in the market, is what we can call 'the 
deal-making society', in which you go into each transaction looking for the 
best deal you can. If you do not get what you expected, or are given poor 
value, you have a right to complain, and perhaps, go to law. The second is 
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less easy to characterise but might be thought of as 'taking the rough with 
the smooth'  or the 'swings and roundabouts'  society. In this case the idea is 
that there are general rules or policies of distribution which sometimes yield 
good results and sometimes bad, but rather than judging each transaction on 
its merits we should judge the practice as a whole. 
This 'rough with the smooth' attitude is, in general, the attitude we are 
encouraged to take with respect to public services. For example, someone 
may know that some of her taxes go to pay for public libraries, which she 
never uses, and so in that sense is getting a bad deal. She would never join 
the library if it was a private service. However perhaps she has an ailment 
which requires expensive medication which she gets on the national health 
system, and thereby receives a subsidy. So do the standards of the deal-
making society she is being ‘over-charged’ for one good and ‘under-charged’ 
for another. In the ‘rough with the smooth’ society she just never does the 
calculations. Here the thought is that it is possible that we can all be better 
off if we take the rough with the smooth and goods are supplied publicly. In 
some cases we win, in some cases we lose, but we win overall in two ways. 
First, the administrative costs of individual pricing would make a private 
system more expensive, and second we gain in social solidarity.
Now the first of these is a contingent claim and one many will think false, 
believing that individual pricing encourages efficiency in other ways. However 
it is likely to be true for some goods and false for others, and where it is true 
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this is a good reason for having public provision in that area. But social 
solidarity - a sense that we are all in this together - is encouraged by keeping 
the public sector large. However the positive effects of this will drain away of 
the sector as a whole is thought to be inefficient and wasteful: there needs to 
be at least belief in net gain.
Of course some individuals will not gain materially. And if they dwell on this, 
and let it affect them too much, they will not gain in other ways. So we need 
to maintain a difficult balance. If we are to achieve the best results, we need 
to be able to ask whether, as a whole, public services give good value, while 
not asking 'do they give me good value?'. What is even worse is the question 
'do I get good value from each public service?' Once this last question is 
commonplace public services will be vulnerable, and our potential loss will be 
very great. Hence we need to preserve a public sector and subject it only to 
some sorts of scrutiny if we want it to be a vehicle of social solidarity as well 
as efficient provision.
In conclusion, I think we have very good reason for resisting market 
imperialism. But this will rarely be because of the intrinsic nature of any good
makes distribution by market norms inappropriate.
